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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 13-3467 
______ 
 
DANIELLE SANTOMENNO, for the use and benefit of the 
John Hancock Trust and the John Hancock Funds II; KAREN 
POLEY and BARBARA POLEY for the use and benefit of 
the John Hancock Funds II; DANIELLE SANTOMENNO, 
KAREN POLEY and BARBARA POLEY individually and 
on behalf of ERISA employee benefit plans that held, or 
continue to hold, group variable annuity contracts issued/sold 
by John Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.), and the 
participants and beneficiaries of all such ERISA covered 
employee benefit plans; and DANIELLE SANTOMENNO 
individually and on behalf of any person or entity that is a 
party to, or has acquired rights under, an individual or group 
variable annuity contract that was issued/sold by John 
Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.) where the 
underlying investment was a John Hancock proprietary fund 
contained in the John Hancock Trust 
 
                                   Danielle Santomenno; 
                                   Karen Poley; 
                                   Barbara Poley, 
                                                   Appellants 
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 v. 
 
JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
(U.S.A); JOHN HANCOCK INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC;  
JOHN HANCOCK FUNDS; LLC,  
JOHN HANCOCK DISTRIBUTORS, LLC 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. 2-10-cv-01655) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
______ 
 
Argued June 12, 2014 
Before:  FISHER, VAN ANTWERPEN and TASHIMA,
*
 
Circuit Judges. 
(Filed: September 26, 2014 ) 
 
 
Arnold C. Lakind, Esq. 
Robert L. Lakind, Esq. 
Robert E. Lytle, Esq. 
Moshe Maimon, Esq. 
Stephen Skillman, Esq.  ARGUED 
                                                 
*
The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge 
for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
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 Counsel for Appellees 
 
Jonathon B. Lower, Esq. 
Brian J. McMahon, Esq. 
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Newark, NJ 07102 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
Radha Vishnuvajjala, Esq.  ARGUED 
United States Department of Labor, Room N-4611 
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
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 Counsel for Amicus Curiae Secretary United States 
Department of Labor 
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Eric S. Mattson, Esq. 
Sidley Austin 
One South Dearborn Street 
Chicago, IL 60603 
 Counsel for Amicus Curiae American Council of Life 
Insurers 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellants Danielle Santomenno, Karen 
Poley, and Barbara Poley (collectively, “Participants”) 
invested money in 401(k) benefit plans.  They brought suit on 
behalf of themselves and a putative class of benefit plans and 
plan participants that have held or continue to hold group 
annuity contracts with Defendant-Appellees John Hancock 
Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.), John Hancock Investment 
Management Services, LLC, John Hancock Funds, LLC, and 
John Hancock Distributors, LLC (collectively, “John 
Hancock”).  They allege that John Hancock charged 
excessive fees for its services in breach of its fiduciary duty 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.  The District Court 
granted John Hancock’s motion to dismiss, ruling that John 
Hancock was not a fiduciary with respect to the alleged 
breaches.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
A. 
 Participants were enrolled in the J&H Berge, Inc. 
401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the “Berge Plan”) and the Scibal 
Associates, Inc. 401(k) Plan (the “Scibal Plan,” and together 
with the Berge Plan, the “Plans”).  401(k) plans are a type of 
“defined contribution” plan governed by ERISA.  Each of the 
Plans had a trustee, and the trustees contracted with John 
Hancock to provide a product known as a group variable 
annuity contract.  As part of this product, John Hancock 
assembled for the Plans a variety of investment options into 
which Participants could direct their contributions.  This 
collection of investment options was referred to as the “Big 
Menu,” and was composed primarily of John Hancock mutual 
funds, such as the John Hancock Trust-Money Market Trust 
(“Money Market Trust”), but also included independent funds 
offered by other companies.   
 From the Big Menu created by John Hancock the 
trustees selected which investment options to offer to their 
Plan participants, known as the “Small Menu.”  Participants 
could then select from the options on the Small Menu where 
to invest their 401(k) contributions.  Rather than investing 
each Participant’s contributions directly into an investment 
option (for example, a mutual fund), John Hancock directed 
plan participants’ contributions into separate sub-accounts, 
each of which was correlated with an underlying investment 
option.  John Hancock would pool the contributions in the 
sub-accounts, and then invest them in the corresponding 
investment option.  Plan trustees could select for their Small 
Menus any option off the Big Menu, as well as investments 
offered by companies other than John Hancock.  See JA at 
219, Berge Contract § 1 (defining “Competing Investment 
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Option” as a fund “available under the Plan, either in the 
Contract or elsewhere”). 
 As part of its agreement with the Plans, John Hancock 
offered a product feature called the Fiduciary Standards 
Warranty (“FSW”).  Plan trustees received this feature if they 
selected for their Small Menus at least nineteen funds offered 
by John Hancock, rather than independent funds.  Under the 
FSW, John Hancock “warrants and covenants that the 
investment options Plan fiduciaries select to offer to Plan 
participants: Will satisfy the prudence requirement of . . . 
ERISA.”  JA at 59, Second Amended Complaint 
(“Complaint” or “SAC”) ¶ 170.  If a trustee constructed its 
Small Menu in accordance with the FSW, John Hancock 
agreed that it would reimburse the plan for any losses arising 
out of litigation challenging the prudence of the plan’s 
investment selections, including litigation costs.  In the FSW, 
John Hancock stated that it was “not a fiduciary,” and that the 
FSW “does not guarantee that any particular Investment 
option is suited to the needs of any individual plan participant 
and, thus, does not cover any claims by any Individual 
participant based on the needs of, or suitability for, such 
participant.”  JA at 414. John Hancock also offered a service 
called the “Fund Check Fund Review and Scorecard.” 
Through this program, John Hancock monitored the 
performance of all investment options on the Big Menu, 
distributed copies of its evaluations to plan trustees, and 
informed them as to changes in the Big Menu made in 
response to these evaluations.   
 When Participants invested in a particular sub-account, 
they were subject to three fees: an Administrative 
Maintenance Charge (“AMC”); a Sales & Service (“S&S”) 
fee; and the fee charged by the underlying mutual fund, 
known as a 12b-1 fee after the provision in the securities 
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regulations that authorizes their payment out of plan assets.  
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1.  The sum of these fees is referred 
to as the “expense ratio” for each sub-account.   
 John Hancock retained the authority to add, delete, or 
substitute the investment options it offered on the Big Menu.  
Under what it referred to as its “Underlying Fund 
Replacement Regimen,” John Hancock reviewed investment 
options “on a daily, monthly, quarterly, and annual basis” and 
replaced them “[i]f it . . . determined that the investment 
option is no longer able to deliver its value proposition to 
[John Hancock’s] clients and there is a viable replacement 
option.”  JA at 63, SAC ¶¶ 189-90.  For example, in 2009, 
John Hancock removed the “John Hancock Classic Value 
Fund” and replaced it with the “T. Rowe Price Equity Income 
Fund.”  JA at 57, SAC ¶ 158.  John Hancock also retained the 
authority to change the share class for each fund into which 
the Participants’ contributions were invested.  The expense 
ratio of a fund will depend, in part, on the share class in 
which it invests.  Notwithstanding John Hancock’s authority 
over the construction of the Big Menu and its selection of 
share classes, the trustees retained the responsibility for 
selecting investment options for inclusion in the Small Menu 
and for offering to Participants.   
B. 
 Participants filed this suit on March 31, 2010, and filed 
a second amended complaint on October 22, 2010.  Counts I 
through VII were brought under ERISA.  Counts VIII and IX 
were brought under two provisions of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.  
John Hancock moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the District Court granted in 
its entirety.  With respect to the ERISA claims, the District 
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Court concluded that dismissal was proper because 
Participants did not make a pre-lawsuit demand and did not 
join the plan trustees in the suit.  Participants appealed, and 
we affirmed dismissal of the ICA claims, but vacated the 
portion of the District Court’s order dismissing the ERISA 
claims and remanded for further proceedings.  Santomenno v. 
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 677 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We concluded that the District Court’s reliance on the 
common law of trusts to engraft pre-suit demand and 
mandatory joinder requirements was inconsistent with 
ERISA’s intent.  Id. at 189. 
 On remand, John Hancock renewed its motion to 
dismiss, raising a variety of arguments.  Some of John 
Hancock’s arguments were raised in its first motion to 
dismiss and some were not, and Participants asserted that 
John Hancock was barred from raising new arguments in its 
renewed motion.  John Hancock’s lack of fiduciary status, 
however, had been raised in the first motion, and the District 
Court decided the case solely on that basis.  See Santomenno 
v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), No. 10-1655, 2013 
WL 3864395, at *4 n.2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013).   The District 
Court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that John 
Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to any of 
the misconduct alleged in the complaint.  Participants timely 
appealed.  The Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief in 
support of Participants urging reversal, and the American 
Council of Life Insurers (“ACLI”), filed an amicus brief in 
support of John Hancock urging affirmance.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order of dismissal 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of that order is 
plenary.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2009).   
 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 
we treat as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, which 
we construe in the “‘light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” 
Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 
374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  To survive a motion to dismiss, “a 
claimant must state a ‘plausible’ claim for relief, and ‘[a] 
claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”  Thompson v. 
Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 
2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).   Whether the facts alleged in the 
complaint adequately plead fiduciary status is a question we 
review de novo.  Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 
220 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 Generally, a court considering a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) may consider only the allegations 
contained in the pleading to determine its sufficiency.  Pryor 
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 
2002).  “However, the court may consider documents which 
are attached to or submitted with the complaint, as well as . . . 
. documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and 
whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not 
physically attached to the pleading. . . .”  Id. (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting 62 Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 62:508).  Similarly, 
“[d]ocuments that the defendant attaches to the motion to 
dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are 
referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the 
claim.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 62 Fed. Proc., L.Ed. 
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§ 62:508).  Accordingly, we may consider the Plan contracts 
and supporting documents in our disposition of this appeal. 
III. 
A. 
 ERISA is a “‘comprehensive’” statute that is “the 
product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation’s 
private employee benefit system.”  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 
508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).  Participants 
are enrolled in ERISA-regulated 401(k) plans.  See LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 255 (2008) 
(recognizing that “[d]efined contribution plans” – which 
include 401(k) plans – “dominate the retirement plan scene 
today”).  ERISA imposes fiduciary responsibilities on certain 
persons.  ERISA fiduciaries must act solely in the interest of 
the plan participants and beneficiaries and must act to 
“defray[] reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”  29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii).  Participants assert breaches of 
fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1104(a), 1106(a)-(b).   
 ERISA provides that a person is a fiduciary to a plan if 
the plan identifies them as such.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).  It 
also provides that: 
[A] person is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan to the extent 
(i) he exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or 
control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets, 
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(ii) he renders investment advice 
for a fee or other compensation, 
direct or indirect, with respect to 
any moneys or other property of 
such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or 
 
(iii) he has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the 
administration of such plan. Such 
term includes any person 
designated under section 
1105(c)(1)(B) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).   
 To be a fiduciary within the meaning of § 
1002(21)(A), a person must “act[] in the capacity of manager, 
administrator, or financial advisor to a ‘plan.’”  Pegram v. 
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222 (2000).  This so-called 
“functional” fiduciary duty is contextual – it arises “only to 
the extent” a person acts in an administrative, managerial, or 
advisory capacity to an employee benefits plan.  Id. at 225-26 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “Because an entity is 
only a fiduciary to the extent it possesses authority or 
discretionary control over the plan, we ‘must ask whether [the 
entity] is a fiduciary with respect to the particular activity in 
question.’”  Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 321 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Srein, 323 F.3d at 221; and citing 29 U.S.C. § 
12 
 
1002(21)(A); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA 
Litig., 579 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Thus, “the 
threshold question is not whether the actions of some person 
employed to provide services under a plan adversely affected 
a plan beneficiary’s interest, but whether that person was 
acting as a fiduciary (that is, performing a fiduciary function) 
when taking the action subject to complaint.”  Pegram, 530 
U.S. at 226. 
 Before proceeding too deeply into our analysis, it is 
necessary first to clarify precisely what Participants claim in 
this case.  Each Count that Participants levy against John 
Hancock alleges the charging of excessive fees in breach of 
fiduciary duty.  See Participants’ Br. at 12.1  Counts I and II 
of the Complaint challenge payment of the S&S fees, 
alleging: (1) that contrary to John Hancock’s claim that the 
S&S fees were used to pay for services by third parties, the 
S&S fees were in fact revenue for John Hancock; and (2) that 
the S&S fees were excessive because they were in excess of, 
and duplicative of, the underlying funds’ 12b-1 fees.  Counts 
III and IV allege that John Hancock breached its fiduciary 
responsibility by selecting for the Big Menu investment 
options that charged 12b-1 fees, claiming that John Hancock 
                                                 
1
 Counts VI and VII alleged, respectively, that John Hancock 
wrongly included funds on  the Big Menu that paid it revenue 
sharing, and that John Hancock breached its fiduciary duty by 
selecting a particular fund for inclusion on the Big Menu that 
allegedly carried high fees with low returns.  At oral 
argument, counsel for Participants stated that while it was 
“not withdrawing these two counts,” it was “limiting [them] 
to claims of excessive fees.”  Oral Arg. Rec. at 1:20-2:00.  
Accordingly, we consider forfeited any claims of wrongdoing 
other than the charging of excessive fees. 
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should have negotiated with the underlying funds for access 
to a share class that did not impose these fees.  Count V 
alleges that John Hancock’s Big Menu should not have 
included funds that paid certain advisor fees that Participants 
allege were excessive.   
 Participants state that “[t]he alleged breach of fiduciary 
duty consists solely of John Hancock charging excessive fees 
for the performance of its fiduciary functions.” Reply Br. at 7.  
But this is not quite correct: the question in this case is not 
whether John Hancock acted as a fiduciary to the Plans at 
some point and in some manner and then charged an 
excessive fee for that fiduciary service; rather, the question is 
whether John Hancock acted as a fiduciary to the Plans with 
respect to the fees that it set.  With that in mind, we now turn 
to the parties’ arguments.2 
B. 
                                                 
2
 John Hancock briefly argues that Participants lack standing 
to challenge any conduct by which they were not affected 
because they have not suffered an injury-in-fact.  See Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  We reject 
this argument.  As we will discuss, some of Participants’ 
asserted grounds for fiduciary status lack a nexus with the 
wrongdoing alleged in the Complaint, and therefore cannot 
provide a basis for relief.  But John Hancock’s argument 
conflates the injuries pleaded in the Complaint – the monetary 
loss to the Plans caused by what Participants allege were 
excessive fees – with the fiduciary duties that Participants 
allege were breached.  Participants have clearly alleged an 
injury-in-fact – monetary loss.  Whether that injury was 
caused by John Hancock’s breach of a fiduciary duty, and 
whether John Hancock had a fiduciary duty in the first place, 
are questions for the merits, not for standing.   
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 Participants allege that John Hancock is an ERISA 
fiduciary because: (1) it exercised discretionary authority 
respecting management of the Plans; and (2) it rendered 
investment advice to the Plans for a fee.
3
  The Secretary joins 
some of Participants’ arguments, and advances some of his 
own.  We will address each in turn. 
1. 
 ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on any person who 
“exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of [a] plan or exercises any authority 
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets.”  
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).  Subsection (i) is thus composed 
of two discrete activities: (1) the exercise of discretionary 
management or discretionary control over the plan; and (2) 
the exercise of any authority or control over the management 
or disposition of plan assets.  The two prongs of subsection 
(i) differentiate between “those who manage the plan in 
general, and those who manage the plan assets.”  Bd. of Trs. 
of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local 6 of N.J. Welfare 
                                                 
3
 Participants argue in a single sentence that John Hancock is 
a fiduciary under subsection (iii) of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), 
which imposes a fiduciary duty on any person “to the extent . 
. . he has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of [a] plan.”  This brief 
aside is insufficient to preserve the argument, and thus we do 
not consider it.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is 
waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for 
those purposes a passing reference to an issue . . . will not 
suffice to bring that issue before this court.” (omission in 
original) (quoting Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 
1066 (3d Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Fund v. Wettlin Assocs., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Participants argue that John Hancock is a fiduciary 
only under the first prong. 
 “Only discretionary acts of plan . . . management 
trigger fiduciary duties.”  Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. 
Co., 725 F.3d 406, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2013).  Consequently, a 
service provider owes no fiduciary duty to a plan with respect 
to the terms of its service agreement if the plan trustee 
exercised final authority in deciding whether to accept or 
reject those terms.  See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 
583 (7th Cir. 2009), supplemented by 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 
2009).  This makes sense: when a service provider and a plan 
trustee negotiate at arm’s length over the terms of their 
agreement, discretionary control over plan management lies 
not with the service provider but with the trustee, who decides 
whether to agree to the service provider’s terms.   
 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hecker stands 
strongly for this point.  There, participants in two 401(k) 
plans sued their plans’ sponsor (Deere & Co.), record keeper 
(Fidelity Trust), and investment advisor (Fidelity Research), 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty for selecting investment 
options with excessive fees and costs, and by failing to 
disclose the fee structure.  Hecker, 556 F.3d at 578.  The plan 
participants alleged that Fidelity Trust had the necessary 
control to take on a fiduciary responsibility because it limited 
the selection of funds available under the plans to those 
managed by its sister company, Fidelity Research.  Id. at 583.  
This was irrelevant, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, because 
even if Fidelity Research limited the scope of funds available 
under its plan, it was ultimately the responsibility of the plan 
sponsor – Deere & Co. – to decide which options to offer to 
plan participants.  Id.  Fidelity Trust therefore lacked the 
discretion necessary to confer upon it a fiduciary 
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responsibility. 
 Two years later, we decided Renfro.  The allegations in 
Renfro were similar to those made here: plan participants 
sued not only the plan’s sponsor, but also the service 
provider, Fidelity Management Trust Co., alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty by selecting for the plan investment options 
that carried excessive fees.  671 F.3d at 317, 319.  Fidelity 
conceded that it was a fiduciary with respect to certain 
functions, but argued that it was not a fiduciary “with respect 
to the challenged conduct of selecting and retaining 
investment options” in the plan.  Id. at 322-23.4  There, like 
John Hancock argues here, Fidelity disclaimed any role in 
making the final decision on what investment options to offer 
plan participants.  Compare id. at 323 (“The agreement 
expressly disclaimed any role for Fidelity in selecting 
investment options, stating, ‘[Fidelity entities] shall have no 
responsibility for the selection of investment options under 
the Trust.’”), with JA at 220, Berge Contract § 3 
(“Contributions remitted to this Contract may be invested 
only in the Investment Options selected by the 
Contractholder”), and JA at 278, Scibal Contract § 3 (same).  
Also like this case, the sponsor in Renfro was free to include 
in its plan funds not offered by Fidelity.  Compare 671 F.3d 
at 319 (“The agreement did not prohibit Unisys from adding 
non-Fidelity options to its plan, and administering them itself, 
or from contracting with another company to administer non-
Fidelity investments.”), with JA at 219, Berge Contract § 1 
(defining “Competing Investment Option” as a fund 
                                                 
4
 Fidelity was a “directed trustee,” which “is a fiduciary 
‘subject to proper directions’ of one of the plan’s named 
fiduciaries.”  Renfro, 671 F.3d at 323 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 
1103(a)(1)).   
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“available under the Plan, either in the Contract or 
elsewhere”). 
 We concluded that, because Fidelity had “no 
contractual authority to control the mix and range of 
investment options, to veto” the sponsor’s selections, or to 
prevent the sponsor from offering competing investment 
options, it lacked the discretionary authority necessary to 
create a fiduciary responsibility as to these activities.  Renfro, 
671 F.3d at 323.  We further noted, relying on Hecker, that a 
service provider “‘does not act as a fiduciary with respect to 
the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the 
named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.’”  
Id. at 324 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 583).  The plan 
participants alleged that they were injured by excessive fees 
caused by the fee structure that the plan sponsor and Fidelity 
had negotiated, but “Fidelity owe[d] no fiduciary duty with 
respect to the negotiation of its fee compensation.”  Id. 
  The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Leimkuehler 
v. American United Life Insurance Co., 713 F.3d 905 (7th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1280 (2014), provides a 
final point of guidance.  In Leimkuehler, a plan and its trustee 
sued the 401(k) service provider, American United Life 
Insurance Co. (“AUL”), alleging that AUL breached a 
fiduciary duty by engaging in the practice of revenue sharing.  
Id. at 907-08.  Under AUL’s revenue sharing plan, it received 
a portion of the fees charged by the underlying mutual funds 
to plan participants.  Id. at 909.  Like here, AUL created a big 
menu of funds that it offered to the plan sponsor, who in turn 
composed a small menu to offer to the plan participants.  Id. 
at 910.  Also like here, plan participants invested their 
contributions into separate accounts, which in turn were 
invested in specific mutual funds.  Id. at 908.  In addition to 
selecting which funds to include on its big menu, AUL chose 
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what share class would be offered, which in turn affected the 
expense ratio paid by plan participants and the amount of 
AUL’s revenue sharing.  Id. at 909-10.   
 The Seventh Circuit concluded that AUL was not a 
fiduciary with respect to revenue sharing.  First, just as in 
Hecker, AUL did not take on a fiduciary status with respect to 
its “product design” – that is, the manner in which it crafted 
its menu of investment options and what funds and share 
classes it elected to include (and the accompanying expense 
ratios of those options).  Id. at 911.  This was so because the 
expense ratio for each fund AUL offered was fully disclosed, 
and the plan sponsor “was free to seek a better deal with a 
different 401(k) service provider if he felt that AUL’s 
investment options were too expensive.”  Id. at 912.  Second, 
the court rejected the argument that AUL’s maintenance of 
separate sub-accounts created a fiduciary duty because the 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty did not involve 
mismanagement of the separate accounts.  Id. at 913 (“AUL’s 
control over the separate account can support a finding of 
fiduciary status only if Leimkuehler’s claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty arise from AUL’s handling of the separate 
account. They do not.” (paragraph break omitted)).   
 Participants here identify three actions that purportedly 
made John Hancock a fiduciary under the first prong of 
subsection (i).  They allege that John Hancock was a fiduciary 
because it selected the investment options to be included in 
the Big Menu, because it monitored the performance of the 
funds on the Big Menu, and because, under the terms of its 
contracts with the Berge and Scibal Plans, it had the authority 
to add, remove, or substitute the investment options that it 
offered to the Plans and to alter the fees it charged for its 
services.  See Participants’ Br. at 2.  Participants’ position is 
that “once a party has [the] status of a functional fiduciary, 
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they have all the obligations that ERISA imposes upon them, 
and those obligations include the obligation not to charge 
excessive fees.” Oral Arg. Rec. at 5:18-5:35. 
 Participants’ first argument is foreclosed by Renfro, 
Hecker, and Leimkuehler, which together make clear that 
John Hancock is not a fiduciary with respect to the manner in 
which it composed the Big Menu, including its selection of 
investment options and the accompanying fee structure.  The 
Big Menu’s fund selections and expense ratios are “product 
design” features of the type that Leimkuehler concluded do 
not give rise to a fiduciary duty.  713 F.3d at 911 
(“[S]electing which funds will be included in a particular 
401(k) investment product, without more, does not give rise 
to a fiduciary responsibility . . . .”).  Moreover, we expressly 
stated in Renfro that a service provider “owes no fiduciary 
duty with respect to the negotiation of its fee compensation.”  
671 F.3d at 324.
5
  Here, even if they were incentivized to 
select certain funds by John Hancock’s promise of 
indemnification in the FSW, the trustees still exercised final 
authority over what funds would be included on the Small 
                                                 
5
 Participants argue that Renfro’s holding that a service 
provider has no fiduciary duty in the negotiation of its fee 
compensation is dictum that we are not obliged to follow.  
Participants’ Br. at 35-36.  We disagree.  Renfro rejected the 
argument that Fidelity could be liable as a co-fiduciary with 
the plan sponsor for excessive fees and the selection of 
investment options, because it simply was not a fiduciary 
with respect to that conduct.  See 671 F.3d at 324; see also 29 
U.S.C. § 1105(a) (allowing “a fiduciary . . . [to] be liable for a 
breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary” 
(emphasis added)).   
 
20 
 
Menus (and, by extension, what the accompanying expense 
ratios would be).  Nothing prevented the trustees from 
rejecting John Hancock’s product and selecting another 
service provider; the choice was theirs.  See Hecker, 556 F.3d 
at 583 (recognizing that “a service provider does not act as a 
fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if 
it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and 
approval of those terms”).6 
                                                 
6
 Participants urge that the District Court erred in following 
Renfro and Leimkuehler, and that instead we should take 
guidance from two out-of-circuit district court decisions, 
Charters v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., 583 F. Supp. 
2d 189 (D. Mass. 2008), and Santomenno v. Transamerica 
Life Insurance Co., No. 12-2782, 2013 WL 603901 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 19, 2013).  We find neither case persuasive. 
 
 The plaintiff in Charters sued the service provider 
over AMC revenue and for receiving revenue sharing paid by 
the underlying mutual funds.  583 F. Supp. 2d at 192.  The 
district court concluded that the provider was a fiduciary 
because its contract gave it discretion to set the AMC up to a 
contractual maximum or exceed the contractual maximum 
upon three-months’ notice to the sponsor, and because it 
imposed a 2% termination fee, which the district court 
believed limited the sponsor’s ability to freely reject changes.  
Id. 197-99.  We find Charters unavailing. First, it predates 
Renfro and Leimkuehler, and for that reason alone the 
persuasive value of its holding that a service provider owes a 
fiduciary duty with respect to its fee arrangement is sharply 
diminished.  Second, in this case, John Hancock did not 
impose a penalty, and therefore there is no obstacle to 
cancellation that limits the trustees’ discretion to reject 
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 Participants’ second argument is that John Hancock 
became a fiduciary by monitoring the performance of the 
investment options offered on the Big Menu through its Fund 
Check and Underlying Fund Replacement Regimen 
programs.  Participants’ Br. at 34.  But we do not see how 
monitoring the performance of the funds that it offers and 
relaying that information to the trustees, who retain ultimate 
authority for selecting the funds to be included on the Small 
Menus, gives John Hancock discretionary control over 
anything, much less management of the Plans.  See, e.g, JA at 
399 (stating in the FSW that “Plan fiduciaries are still 
                                                                                                             
proposed changes. 
 
 Transamerica is even less persuasive.  There, the 
district court rejected Hecker’s holding that a service provider 
has no fiduciary duty with respect to the terms of its 
compensation if the named fiduciary is free to negotiate and 
approve or reject the contract, calling it “formalistic line-
drawing” that would lead to the “reductio ad absurdum” of 
allowing a service provider to negotiate for a 99% fee.  
Transamerica, 2013 WL 603901, at *6.  First, this reasoning 
is flatly inconsistent with our controlling decision in Renfro, 
which cited Hecker with approval for the proposition that 
there is no fiduciary duty with regard to contract negotiations.  
See 671 F.3d at 324.  Second, as John Hancock correctly 
observes, Transamerica’s logic is flawed because any plan 
sponsor who agreed to a 99% fee arrangement would itself be 
liable for breaching its fiduciary duty to “defray[] reasonable 
expenses of administering the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1)(A)(ii).  Therefore, it is unnecessary to impose a 
fiduciary duty on the service provider in order to protect plan 
assets from excessive fees.   
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required to properly discharge their responsibilities in 
determining that John Hancock’s investment process and fund 
lineup is appropriate for their plan”). 
 Participants’ third argument – that John Hancock 
became a fiduciary by retaining the authority to change the 
investment options offered on the Big Menu and alter the fees 
that it charged – likewise fails.  Reply Br. at 16; JA at 226, 
Berge Contract § 15.  First, this activity lacks a nexus with 
the conduct complained of in the Complaint. As John 
Hancock and amicus ACLI observe, Participants do not allege 
that John Hancock breached a fiduciary duty by altering an 
investment option on the Big Menu or by altering their fees.  
Rather, their claim is that the fees John Hancock charged 
(which, as we note above, the Plan sponsors were free to 
accept or reject) were excessive.  Participants urge that 
focusing on their specific allegations is a feint designed “to 
set the stage for John Hancock arguing . . . that [Participants’] 
arguments regarding John Hancock’s status as an ERISA 
fiduciary are not properly pled and therefore should not be 
considered.”  Reply Br. at 3.  But in fact the opposite is true: 
it is clear that a complaint alleging breach of ERISA fiduciary 
duty must plead that the defendant was acting as a fiduciary 
“when taking the action subject to complaint.”  Pegram, 530 
U.S. at 226 (emphasis added).  Lacking this nexus, John 
Hancock’s alleged ability to alter its funds or fees cannot give 
rise to a fiduciary duty in this case. Cf. Leimkuehler, 713 F.3d 
at 913 (recognizing that “control over [a] separate account 
can support a finding of fiduciary status only if [the] claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty arise from [the] handling of the 
separate account” (emphasis added)).  Second, even assuming 
a nexus between the alleged breach and John Hancock’s 
ability to substitute funds, Participants still fail to show that 
John Hancock exercised the discretion over plan management 
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necessary to make it a fiduciary.  Although John Hancock did 
have the contractual right to alter the Big Menu or change its 
fees, it could do so only after giving the trustee “adequate 
notice and sufficient information to decide whether to accept 
or reject any changes that would be fiduciary decisions.”  Id.  
If the trustee rejected the changes, he could “terminate the 
Contract without penalty.”7  Id.  Thus, ultimate authority still 
resided with the trustees, who had the choice whether to 
accept or reject John Hancock’s changes. 
 Participants’ attempt to establish that John Hancock 
acted as a fiduciary under subsection (i) of 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A) fails because its arguments are foreclosed by 
precedent or lack a nexus with the claims in the Complaint, 
and we conclude that the District Court did not err in rejecting 
their arguments. 
2. 
 Participants argue that John Hancock is an ERISA 
fiduciary because it has “render[ed] investment advice [to the 
Plans] for a fee or other compensation.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A)(ii).  At the outset, this alleged basis of fiduciary 
responsibility bears no nexus to the wrongdoing alleged in the 
Complaint: Participants allege the charging of excessive fees, 
not the rendering of faulty investment advice.  See 
                                                 
7
 The Berge Plan indicates that “[d]iscontinuance and other 
charges may still be available” upon cancellation “in 
accordance with the terms of the Contract and the Charge 
Schedule.”  JA at 226, Berge Contract § 15.  However, both 
Plans indicate that the discontinuance fee was “0.000%.”  JA 
at 230, Berge Contract Withdrawal/Discontinuance Charge 
Scale; JA at 291, Scibal Contract Withdrawal and 
Discontinuance Charge Scales.  
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Leimkuehler, 713 F.3d at 913-14.  But even if there were such 
a nexus, we would reject this argument because Participants 
have failed to plead that John Hancock was an investment 
advice fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA.  
 The Department of Labor (“DOL” or “Department”) 
has promulgated a regulation setting forth a five-factor test 
for determining whether an entity has rendered “investment 
advice” for purposes of ERISA fiduciary status.  An entity is 
an investment advice fiduciary if it:  
[1] [R]ender[ed] advice to the 
plan as to the value of securities 
or other property, or makes 
recommendation as to the 
advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities or 
other property . . . [2] on a regular 
basis  . . . [3] pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement or 
understanding, written or 
otherwise, between such person 
and the plan or a fiduciary with 
respect to the plan, [4] that such 
services will serve as a primary 
basis for investment decisions 
with respect to plan assets, and [5] 
that such person will render 
individualized investment advice 
to the plan based on the particular 
needs of the plan. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1).  “All five factors are necessary 
to support a finding of fiduciary status.”  Thomas, Head & 
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Griesen Emps. Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 
1994).   
 As a threshold matter, Participants argue that the DOL 
regulation is invalid as contrary to the plain language of § 
1002(21)(A)(ii).  In support of this argument, they first 
suggest that the Department no longer stands by the 
regulation because it “engrafts additional requirements for 
establishing fiduciary status under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(21)(A)(ii) that narrow the plain language of this 
subsection.”  Participants’ Br. at 21.  Notably, the Secretary 
does not join this argument, and for good reason. 
 The regulation dates to 1975, and in 2010 the DOL 
proposed a new rule that would have broadened the 
circumstances in which a person would be deemed an ERISA 
fiduciary by reason of having rendered investment advice.  
See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65263 
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010).  However, in a press release issued 
on September 19, 2011, the Department stated that it would 
“re-propose” the rule in order to “benefit from additional 
input, review and consideration.”  See News Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, US Labor Department’s EBSA to Re-Propose 
Rule on Definition of a Fiduciary (Sept. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/2011/11-1382-
NAT.html.   The parties dispute whether the Department 
actually “withdrew” consideration of the new rule, but 
whether it did so or not is irrelevant because the new rule has 
not been adopted, and unless and until it becomes law, the 
current regulation remains binding.  See Depenbrock v. Cigna 
Corp., 389 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 We defer to the Department’s reasonable interpretation 
of ambiguous provisions of ERISA.  See Matinchek v. John 
Alden Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 96, 100-01 (3d Cir. 1996); see 
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also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843-33 (1984).  While acknowledging that the 
DOL’s proposed regulation never went into effect, 
Participants argue that its mere proposal somehow weakens 
the deference we owe the current regulation under Chevron.  
This is incorrect because “a proposed regulation does not 
represent an agency’s considered interpretation of its statute,” 
Depenbrock, 389 F.3d at 85 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986)), and therefore it does not 
supplant a prior regulation that was the result of the agency’s 
considered interpretation.  See Littriello v. United States, 484 
F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Plainly, an agency does not 
lose its entitlement to Chevron deference merely because it 
subsequently proposes a different approach in its 
regulations.”).  
 Thus, the normal Chevron analysis applies.  Under that 
familiar rubric, “we ask first ‘whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.  If so, courts, as well 
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.’”  Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 
118, 123 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Geiser, 527 
F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2008)).  If, on the other hand, the 
statute is ambiguous as to the question at hand, “we give 
‘controlling weight’ to the agency’s interpretation unless it is 
‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”  
Id. (quoting Geiser, 527 F.3d at 292).  
 Participants marshal little in the way of support for 
their Chevron argument.  Section 1002(21)(A)(ii) imposes 
fiduciary status on any person who “renders investment 
advice for a fee or other compensation.”  Participants 
tautologically argue, then, that “Congress has unambiguously 
expressed its intent that any party who renders investment 
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advice for a fee is an ERISA fiduciary.”  Participants’ Br. at 
22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This is true insofar as 
that is what the statute says, but this observation tells us 
nothing about what the provision means.  “Chevron deference 
is premised on the idea that where Congress has left a gap or 
ambiguity in a statute within an agency’s jurisdiction, that 
agency has the power to fill in or clarify the relevant 
provisions.”  Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Pa. Inc., 493 
F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843-44).  ERISA does not define “investment advice,” nor 
does it provide a way to determine when such an advisory 
relationship has occurred.  This is precisely the type of 
legislative gap-filling that we entrust to an agency’s sound 
discretion.
8
   
 The DOL regulation is valid, and under it Participants 
have failed to plead that John Hancock was an investment 
advice fiduciary.  In order for a fiduciary relationship to arise 
under subsection (ii), John Hancock must have rendered 
investment advice to the plans “pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement or understanding.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2510.3-21(c)(1)(ii)(B).  Participants argue that a mutually 
understood advisory relationship existed because “John 
Hancock provide[d] . . . investment advice pursuant to 
contracts entered into with employer sponsors such as Berge 
and Scibal.”  Participants’ Br. at 23.  But far from showing 
mutual assent to an advisory relationship, the contracts 
between the Plans and John Hancock show just the opposite: 
that John Hancock expressly disclaimed taking on any 
                                                 
8
 Participants do not even attempt to argue Chevron step two, 
that the DOL regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.  See Participants’ Br. at 22. 
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fiduciary relationship.  See JA at 226, Berge Contract § 15 
(“[John Hancock] does not assume the responsibility of the 
Contractholder, Plan Administrator, Plan Sponsor or any 
other Fiduciary of the Plan . . . .”); JA at 285, Scibal Contract 
§ 17 (“By performing these services, [John Hancock] does 
not assume the responsibility of the Contractholder, Plan 
Administrator or any other Fiduciary of the Plan.”).  
Similarly, in the FSW John Hancock stated that “we are not a 
fiduciary.”  JA at 414.  It is true that, subject to limited 
exceptions not relevant here, ERISA precludes fiduciaries 
from contracting away their responsibilities.  See 29 U.S.C. § 
1110(a) (“[A]ny provision in an agreement or instrument 
which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or 
liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this 
part shall be void as against public policy.”); In re Schering 
Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 593 (3d Cir. 2009).  
But this does not answer the question of whether John 
Hancock has taken on fiduciary status in the first place.  
Participants point only to the contracts themselves as support 
for the existence of a mutually assented-to advisory 
relationship between the parties, but the terms of the contracts 
belie their argument. 
 This alone is enough to defeat Participants’ argument 
and we need not proceed further.  Buster, 24 F.3d at 1117.  
Participants have failed to satisfactorily plead that John 
Hancock was an investment advice fiduciary under ERISA. 
3. 
 The Secretary argues that John Hancock had fiduciary 
status under both prongs of subsection (i), and as a plan 
administrator under subsection (iii).  We reject these 
arguments as meritless or waived. 
 The Secretary first argues that John Hancock exercised 
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“discretionary authority or discretionary control” over plan 
management under the first prong of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(21)(A)(i), because it retained “the authority to 
unilaterally delete and substitute” investment options from the 
Big Menu, even if it did not actually exercise that authority.  
Sec’y of Labor Br. at 15.  The Seventh Circuit rejected this 
precise argument in Leimkuehler, describing it as an 
“unworkable” “‘non-exercise’ theory of exercise” that 
“conflicts with a common-sense understanding of the 
meaning of ‘exercise,’ is unsupported by precedent, and 
would expand fiduciary responsibilities under Section 
1002(21)(A) to entities that took no action at all with respect 
to a plan.”  713 F.3d at 914.  “Section 1002(21)(A)’s ‘reach is 
limited to circumstances where the individual actually 
exercises some authority.’”  Id. (quoting Trs. of the Graphic 
Commc’ns Int’l Union Upper Midwest Local 1M Health & 
Welfare Plan v. Bjorkedal, 516 F.3d 719, 733 (8th Cir. 
2008)).  Moreover, whether John Hancock could substitute 
investment options on the Big Menu is not relevant to the 
injury that Participants allege, charging excessive fees. 
 Next, the Secretary argues that John Hancock was a 
fiduciary because it “exercise[d]  . . . authority or control 
respecting management or disposition of [Plan] assets,” see 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), and because it had discretionary 
control over plan administration, id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii).  Both 
arguments are waived.  As we noted above, Participants have 
not argued that John Hancock exercised control over plan 
assets, and their single-sentence reference to plan-
administrator fiduciary status failed to preserve that 
argument.  Laborers’ Int’l, 26 F.3d at 398.  The Secretary 
cannot, as amicus, resurrect on appeal issues waived by 
Participants.  See N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (“‘Although an 
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amicus brief can be helpful in elaborating issues properly 
presented by the parties, it is normally not a method for 
injecting new issues into an appeal, at least in cases where the 
parties are competently represented by counsel.’” (quoting 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d 
Cir. 2001)). 
IV. 
 For the reasons that we have discussed, we conclude 
that Participants have failed to plead that John Hancock was a 
fiduciary under ERISA with respect to the actions of John 
Hancock that Participants challenge.  The order of the District 
Court granting John Hancock’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.  
